Turkish Studies

Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates

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ABSTRACT   *The beginning of Turkey's accession negotiations with the European Union on October 3, 2005 constituted an important turning point for Turkey's relations with the EU and for Turkish socio-political transformation. This paper poses the following questions: (i) Is there a Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy as a result of Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU? (ii) If so, then what are the main areas and limits in which Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy has occurred? This paper answers these questions by providing a background of Europeanization; first by differentiating between the member states and the candidate countries; second by analyzing the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy through an investigation of the changes in Turkish foreign policy since 1999 with regards to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), NATO-EU cooperation and Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors.*

Introduction

Since the end of the 1990s, the European Union has been increasingly emphasized as an instrument stimulating a process of Europeanization among its member states. Europeanization, traditionally, has referred to changes in the member states pertaining specifically to the EU's first pillar where a set of procedures, norms and practices emerged that influenced member states' adaptation of the EU's *acquis communaitaire.*[1] The concept of Europeanization as an analytical tool was, then, applied to the changes in the EU members in the second pillar, an intergovernmental pillar in its essence.[2] Since the 2004 enlargement of the EU, Europeanization has been increasingly used to assess the impact of the EU on the socio-political and economic transformation in the candidate countries.[3] Even though most of this analysis is limited to political conditionality and transformation in the first pillar, there have been some attempts to use Europeanization as a conceptual tool to assess changes in foreign policy-making among the candidate countries.

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This paper attempts to assess the Europeanization of foreign policy in acceding countries by examining the Turkish case, focusing mostly on the 2002–09 period. When Turkey began accession negotiations with the European Union on October 3, 2005, this constituted an important turning point for Turkey's relations with the EU and for Turkish socio-political transformation. The question that begs an answer is whether the Turkish accession process constituted an important step in Turkish foreign policy-making, and if so in what manner. A number of scholars argued that, since the 1999 Helsinki Council when Turkey became a candidate for EU accession, the EU has influenced Turkish foreign policy.[4] For example, one could witness some changes in the Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq as well as its position on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the NATO-EU cooperation.[5] There seems to be some transformation in the foreign policy making procedures, mostly due to the changes in the civil-military balances in Turkey. In addition, it is possible to witness a change in Turkey's foreign policy towards its Middle Eastern neighbors from a hard power approach to one that also utilizes soft power instruments. We propose that these changes resulted from Turkey's accession process and that these could be interpreted as Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. This is, of course, not to deny the role of internal changes such as the 2002 and 2007 elections which resulted in the electoral victories of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, for the purposes of the paper, we look at the changes in the Turkish foreign policy contours in response to European norms and the impact of the EU's political conditionality on Turkish foreign policy.[6]

This paper poses the following questions: (i) Is there a Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy as a result of Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU? (ii) If so, then what are the main areas and limits in which Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy has occurred? This paper tries to answer these questions by providing a background of Europeanization, first, by differentiating between the member states and the candidate countries, and second, by an analysis of Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. The paper then investigates the changes in Turkish foreign policy since 1999 with regards to the CFSP, NATO-EU cooperation and its Middle Eastern neighbors from 2002 to 2009.

Europeanization of National Foreign Policy

A leading scholar on Europeanization, Ladrech, defines Europeanization simply as "an incremental process of re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the extent that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making".[7] The Europeanization process has traditionally evolved as a framework for analyzing the changes that occur in the EU member states, specifically with respect to the first pillar issues and the adaptation that the member states go through in various aspects of the EU's *acquis communaitaire*. As noted above, Europeanization as a concept emerged initially as a tool to analyze changes in the EU member states in the first pillar[8] and then has been extended to the analysis of political processes in Central and

Eastern Europe in the most recent wave of enlargement.[9] Europeanization could be defined as

> the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is of political, legal and social institutions associated with the problem solving, that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.[10]

Europeanization can occur in two distinctly different ways. One is through formal policy decisions of the EU and its adaptation by national polities;[11] the second through increased social interactions between European actors and national actors.[12] In the first explanation, it is possible to assess Europeanization as the emergence of a common foreign policy behavior among the member states. The second path is a more constructivist way of treating the process of Europeanization. This does not mean that the process of Europeanization and the EU-ization are the same thing, but that the EU is the only institution that can offer rewards and/or inflict punishments for Europeanization or lack of it. The European collective identity and its norms and rules transcend the European Union without any question;[13] however, because the EU is the only institution with enforcement mechanisms, it becomes the most visible manifestation of the Europeanization process. This is due to the EU's impact on domestic politics in shaping the member states' policies and institutions. There are two important questions here that need to be addressed: To what extent is it possible to apply the logic of Europeanization to the area of common foreign policy-making where national interests still play an important role? This is, mostly, due to the fact that foreign policy coordination is still intergovernmental.[14] A further complication in this question is whether it is possible to infer some conclusions for the acceding countries from the experiences of the member states.

However, there are of course limits to evaluating the changes in foreign policy making due to Europeanization even among the EU member states, let alone the candidate countries. This is largely because of the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and second pillar integration.[15] In order to assess the mechanisms for Europeanization of national foreign policy, either through the norm adaptation on foreign policy-making or through the shared foreign policy behavior , one needs to look at the special character of the CFSP and its impact in creating a common foreign policy behavior among the EU member states.[16] The interactions of national foreign policy decision-makers at the EU level, and especially in the second pillar institutions, create a process whereby European level norms on foreign policy-making emerge and are adopted by the member states.[17]

The increased foreign policy coordination among the EU members first emerged within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC)[18] and later on through the CFSP. It is through these institutionalized settings that a set of common rules has emerged and stimulated a phase of Europeanization in foreign policy.[19] It also was expected to see the impact of Europeanization to be different in candidate countries than in member states. This is largely due to the fact that the EU

institutions have provided a framework within which member states have been able to take joint decisions and/or communicate about their foreign policy choices. In other words, member states are bound to a common institutional setting, albeit an intergovernmental one, when they formulate their foreign policy decisions. This, in turn, provides for the emergence of some common norms and rules of behavior among member states in the area of foreign policy as well.

However, one still needs to acknowledge that these common institutional norms and rules apply even less to the candidate countries and that there is a difference between the member states and the candidate countries with respect to Europeanization of foreign policy. There are two main issues that need to be addressed. First, Europeanization is much harder to assess among the candidate countries, which are yet to become EU members. Second, the Europeanization of foreign policy, an intergovernmental area where national interests still matter and where there is no *acquis communautaire* which could be presented to the candidate as in the first pillar harmonization, for candidate countries differ considerably from member states. These are on top of the fact that Europeanization as a process is less likely to occur in the intergovernmental pillar. In other words, precisely because there are no legally binding rules and regulations for foreign policy that the candidate country is expected to adopt, the Europeanization of foreign policy is essentially different from the Europeanization process witnessed in the first pillar.

Nonetheless, even when one considers these limits on Europeanization, it still is possible to analyze the impact of the EU on foreign policy changes in the candidate countries. There are a number of key concerns here. Firstly, the Europeanization of foreign policy-making for candidate countries might be concerned with changes in the decision-making procedures, which is most probably less of a concern for the member states. This brings into mind that in candidate countries, if there are actors in foreign policy decision-making other than democratically elected officials, for example, the military, the Europeanization of foreign policy-making would essentially lessen the role played by these actors. This would be a basic difference between the member states and candidate countries with respect to Europeanization. Secondly, it would also be possible to argue that a set of norms emerges within the institutional setting of the CFSP that acts as a constraint mechanism on the member states,[20] and it would be expected that the candidate countries adopt them as well, despite not yet being members.

This brings forth the question as to whether there are European norms on foreign policy and/or common rules of behavior. Some European norms include the acceptance of CFSP, identifying with a larger European collectivity, collaboration with other European states in formulating policy, seeking multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to international problems,[21] and the use of diplomatic and economic means rather than military instruments in solving disputes. Once such norms are adopted, they act as boundaries that shape and constrain member state preferences. They guide states when they formulate their own national foreign policy and become especially critical when the EU prepares its common foreign policy goals.[22] It is also important to note here that the common institutional setting that the second

pillar provides for EU members is crucial in the creation of common rules of behavior.[23] A challenge here is to assess the degree of which Europeanization could apply to second pillar integration both for the member states and for candidate countries, which do not yet participate in the common institutions of the CFSP. Europeanization, of course, is not a straightforward process but could either be interpreted as an adaptation to EU norms or as shared foreign policy behavior, i.e., actual change in foreign policy behavior. This, of course, does not mean that in all foreign policy issues, the EU members act as a unified front, but that there has been some coordination in foreign policy-making within the premises of the CFSP.

With respect to the first aspect of Europeanization, which involves changes in foreign policy behavior, institutional changes in decision-making procedures are also expected to occur. This is related to the liberal democracy norm that the EU diffuses in the international sphere. According to the liberal democratic model, no unelected group (such as the military, monarchy, judiciary, or bureaucracy) can hold reserve or tutelary powers that can obstruct policy-making capabilities of the elected officials.[24] Indeed, highly autonomous military institutions that have the power to shape, determine, and veto foreign and domestic policies are against what the EU considers as the "normal way" that a democratic regime functions. As a result, foreign policy cannot be determined exclusively by an institution—military or bureaucratic—that is not accountable to the voters in regular national elections. In European democracies, foreign policy is usually determined by the government with the involvement of civil society groups and after consultation and discussion in the parliament. This is why this paper argues that the changes in Turkish civil-military relations[25] in line with the EU political conditionality have been important in the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. As the military has been a critical actor in Turkish foreign policy decision-making,[26] a relative decline in the role of the military in this area would be a significant indicator of institutional changes in line with the adoption of foreign policy procedures and therefore could be seen as an indicator of Europeanization. The Europeanization of national foreign policy in candidate countries, such as Turkey, could then be assessed with respect to the formal institutional changes in the foreign policy actors. This, of course, is not a concern for the member states. It is also important to note that the democratically elected officials still could decide on the use of force as the foreign policy tool; but what matters here is the decision-making process where appointed officials such as the military do not act as one of the primary decision-makers. Even though this paper does not analyze the changes in the civil-military dynamics in Turkey in line with the EU political conditionality, it is important to note that the 1993 Copenhagen criteria has led to a procedural change in foreign policy-making in Turkey.

In addition to the norm on democratic institutions' role in decision-making, the second norm that the EU seems to generate is the use of economic and diplomatic instruments to achieve foreign policy goals. These civilian tools involve seeking international legitimacy, collaborating with others in the region, and looking for solutions in multilateral settings and international or regional institutions.[27] The Europeanization of foreign policy entails minimal use of military instruments and

force in solving disagreements—even in ones that are perceived as high politics, such as border disputes. According to the EU norms, employment of diplomatic and economic "carrots and sticks" is a better and more legitimate way of handling conflicts. In other words, "hard power" should be replaced with "soft power." This, of course, is not to say that the EU members do not use force to achieve foreign policy objectives, but that hard power is generally seen as the last resort.

Indeed, one could ask the extent to which such European norms in foreign policy have been adapted by the candidate countries. This seems to be problematic even for the member states where serious disputes within the EU emerged.[28] If this is so, then one could also ask whether a "European" way of making decisions, i.e., through consent and coordination of policies, emerges for the candidate countries as well. This might be because "national approaches tend to adapt to norms defined by an international community or institution to which they are closely linked; that this adaptation takes place over time, through a socialization process; and that it may also, in the end, lead to changes in national identity."[29] It is through this perspective that the EU's impact on national foreign policy is important, in terms of its ability to shape and influence the emergence of a European identity and the adaptation of national identities as a result. Even though the final outcome could be assessed as a collective identity formation through foreign policy, there still would be a difference as to what motivates the national centers for this change. Are the EU member states willing to adapt their foreign policy making to a European way because it is the appropriate thing to do and in the longer run internalize these norms? Or are the EU member states maximizing their utility in achieving their foreign policy goals by the Europeanization of their foreign policy? These are two different motivations for the adaptation process; however, if the utility maximization is the main motivation, then one would expect to see a reversal of the adaptation process when key material interests, such as survival, are at stake. It is within the premises of these questions that apply to the member states, that one could develop similar questions for the candidate countries. However, the candidate countries differ from the member states in the fact that they do not necessarily participate in the CFSP institutional setting; therefore, they are not bound by the EU's institutional rules and common patterns of behavior. In addition, candidate countries differ from member states in terms of the procedural changes that they might go through in foreign policy decision-making.

An important aspect of the EU's impact on expanding its norms to the countries in its periphery, external salience of norms, is with respect to the changing procedures of decision-making in foreign policy. Institutionally, Europeanization of foreign policy in candidate countries such as Turkey would result in the increased role of democratic procedures in foreign policy-making. This, of course, is not a major concern for the EU member states where the procedures of foreign policy are relatively more democratic. Similarly, for the candidate countries, the EU expects that foreign policy decisions are taken by elected officials.

In terms of the normative aspect, European values aim to protect and uphold the promotion of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights and minorities.[30] This is furthered by the predominant view in the EU that there should be

limited use of military tools and increased application of diplomatic instruments and economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives.

Accordingly, this paper has two propositions:

Proposition I: The process of Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey would be measured by the increased role of the elected officials and civil society groups in foreign policy decisions.

Proposition II: One would be able to see in Turkish foreign policy an increased use of economic and diplomatic instruments in solving disputes, rather than the possible use of force.

These are different expectations for Europeanization of foreign policy in Turkey compared to the EU member states' experiences. In the next section, the changing parameters of foreign policy-making in Turkey will be analyzed within this framework of Europeanization.

Turkey and the CFSP

Turkey officially became a candidate country for EU membership in the European Council's Helsinki Summit in 1999. This constituted the main turning point in enhancing the EU's influence over Turkey in inducing political change. Six years later, when accession negotiations began with Turkey in October 2005, the EU's impact on the Turkish political structures and norms was enhanced by EU conditionality. It is through the prospect of becoming an EU member-state that the Turkish government initiated a series of political reforms from 1999. The EU's political conditionality and the Turkish desire to fulfill these political criteria in order for accession negotiations to begin became critical in triggering a vast political transformation in Turkey, which in turn impacted collective identity formation in Turkey. This is not to say that the EU had no impact on Turkey prior to 1999. On the contrary, Turkey and the EU have a long relationship since the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963 and the establishment of a customs union in 1995.[31] However, it was not before the 1999 summit and the promise of full membership that the EU became an anchor for Turkey's political liberalization and reform process.[32]

The political reforms adopted in Turkey after 1999 altered civil-military relations and enabled a process of political change. The impact of these reforms, then, was felt in the field of foreign policy as well, especially with regards to the procedural changes and adaptation to the EU level norms. In an analysis of the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, the procedural changes with regards to foreign policy-making come to the forefront, with the civil-military relationship at the core. The positions of the Turkish military and government toward the CFSP and the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) has been mostly determined by the changing dynamics of European security in the post-Cold War era, specifically with respect to the transformations of the NATO and the EU.[33] The Turkish Armed Forces have traditionally advocated the use of military instruments, especially when the strategic interests of the Turkish state are threatened. Because of this inclination, the Turkish military has been lukewarm towards the EU as well as the CFSP.[34] The

implications of such a move could potentially isolate Turkey and damage its strategic interests. From the perception of the military, Turkish interests could be safeguarded better if European states continued to cooperate under the umbrella of the NATO. The military is specifically sensitive about the involvement of Cyprus, as a member of the EU, in common foreign and security policy. These concerns became critical in shaping Turkey's foreign policy.

When the EU decided to create the Rapid Reaction Force in its Helsinki Summit in 1999, the non-EU European members of the NATO, most importantly Turkey, insisted on the application of the Berlin-plus arrangement and the 1999 NATO Summit decisions toward NATO-EU cooperation.[35] The Turkish military and the foreign ministry argued that the NATO assets could be used in EU operations only after all the NATO members approve it, as decided in NATO's Washington Summit of 1999. In December 2002, during the Copenhagen Summit of the European Council, the EU agreed that "the Berlin-plus arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU member states, which are also either NATO members or parties to the 'Partnerships for Peace', and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO."[36] Simply, as long as the EU made use of NATO assets in its operations under the CESDP, Turkey would be able to participate in EU-led operations.

As a result, Turkey has contributed and participated in the EU-led operations that made use of NATO assets since 2003. In addition, Turkey has pledged to contribute to the EU's Headline Goal for 2010 with 6,000 troops, aircraft and ships. This contribution made Turkey the fifth-largest contributor to the EU force of 60,000. As a NATO member since 1952, Turkey has been an important security provider for Europe and has also been socialized into a common identity that revolves around NATO. Turkey's willingness to contribute to European security after 2003 shows that the Turkish military and government still support taking joint decisions with other European countries, at least for operations that draw upon NATO assets and provide for the security of the continent.[37] The Turkish active participation in the NATO missions in Afghanistan, in the UNIFIL in Lebanon in 2006, and in the EU-led operations in the Balkans, all indicate a Europeanization of foreign policy where Turkey demonstrated its ability as a team player for the EU.

Even though Turkish participation in the EU-led operations is an important indicator of diffusion of European norms among decision-makers, it is clear that Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy is also conditioned by strategic interests. When the government and the military believe that the Turkish strategic interests are jeopardized and Turkey is not recognized as an equal partner, there is a tendency to disengage from common decisions.

This inclination was most evident in 2007 when the EU began to plan its operation in Kosovo. From the Turkish point of view, the main problem was that the EU had decided to use NATO facilities and at the same time allowed for arrangements that would include Cyprus in this operation. Since Cyprus must be kept out of the EU-led operations using NATO assets according to the 2002 Copenhagen decisions, the Turkish military and government saw this as a violation of the Berlin-plus arrange-

ments and a threat to the country's strategic interests. The EU defined the mission as a civilian operative—European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)—and therefore, did not see a problem in the inclusion of Cyprus. The Turkish argument was that it would not matter if the operation were civilian or military as long as it used NATO assets. General Yılmaz Oğuz, Turkey's Representative to NATO's Military Committee, communicated Turkey's position to the Council of the EU in May 2007 and argued that "Turkey's expectations are not fulfilled and its concerns are not addressed."[38] The Turkish foreign ministry seemed to agree with the military's concerns. The Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Abdullah Gül, declared that

> Parameters were already set in 2002. You shouldn't expect further flexibility from Turkey, a country that has introduced major contributions to NATO as an ally, on this issue. It shouldn't solely be Turkey that is expected to be flexible. Like NATO does in these kinds of situations, the EU should find a solution to this issue itself, without using its form of a decision mechanism as an excuse.[39]

This impasse was highly significant for the future of the European common foreign policy. As the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn claimed, "this is a problem for Europe and it hurts the EU, and its troops."[40]

Despite calls for cooperation, the Turkish government and military objected to the use of NATO assets in the operation. In March 2008, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made an attempt to override the Turkish veto by holding an unofficial meeting between the EU and NATO. The Turkish side fiercely reacted to that meeting, arguing that this went against the general rules and practices of NATO "since NATO functions on a consensus basis."[41] Turkey believed that such a meeting could not take place without the consent of all members. Even though the meeting was cancelled, the immediate impact of the crisis was felt between the Turkish government and the military.

The military believed that unless the dispute was settled, Turkey should not contribute to the EU mission. However, the government opposed to the military's position. The civilian cabinet was concerned about the possibility that "Turkey might be excluded from the international body which will for some time have a say in the administration of Kosovo."[42] As a result, the government decided to contribute to the EU's Kosovo mission. However, the cabinet still agreed with the military on the use of NATO assets. In summer 2008, Turkey effectively said no to the EULEX's access to NATO and vetoed the modalities which would have enabled the EULEX to take over from UN forces.[43]

Despite the agreement between the military and cabinet on the use of NATO assets, the government still wanted to be part of the EU mission. This was an interesting turn of events reminding one of the rows between President Turgut Özal and the Turkish Chief of Staff Torumtay[44] over Turkey's participation in the UN multi-lateral force in 1990–91 Gulf War. This is important to note because it reflects on the emerging dynamics of foreign policy decision-making in Turkey. It also

demonstrates the limits of norm diffusion among the state actors. Even though the government is more willing than the armed forces to cooperate with the EU members, the fact is that both the civilian cabinet and the military still have concerns when the strategic interests of Turkey are threatened. When there are no such concerns, both actors support Turkish participation in European common security and foreign policy. The Turkish government's position differed from the military's position in Kosovo and this was an important revelation with respect to Europeanization of foreign policy. In the European Union or, for that matter, in any democracy, the military implements the decisions taken by democratically elected policy-makers. The dispute between the government and the armed forces in Turkey over Kosovo operation indicated that this norm was also now considered in Turkey as well, most probably as a result of the Europeanization process. This could be seen as an illustration of the institutional changes in Turkish foreign policy where the government took the leadership role on a foreign policy issue. This is also indicative of the possible normative impact of the EU. This, in turn, enables us to conclude that our Proposition I, where Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy is measured through the increased role of the elected officials and institutional changes, is supported empirically. Equally important, there has been a change in Turkish foreign policy not only in terms of procedures but in its basic formulations, which is addressed in the next section.

Contours of New Turkish Foreign Policy

Until relatively recently, Turkish foreign policy was based on a "coercive regional"[45] approach and a "national security-centered understanding."[46] In the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was mostly formulated to deal with perceived threats from neighboring countries. For example, in 1995, the Turkish parliament threatened Greece with war if it increased its coastal waters in the Aegean from six to 12 miles, and in 1996, the two countries came to brink of war over islets in the Aegean Sea. As for its southern neighbors, Turkey also had hostile relations with Syria and to a certain extent with Iraq. Turkey and Syria clashed over the distribution of water from Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and Turkey accused Syria of harboring Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK.[47] In 1998, Turkey came close to declaring war against Syria in order to pressure its neighbor to deport Öcalan. Kurdish separatist activities also resulted in deterioration of relations with Iraq. The de facto autonomy of northern Iraq after the Gulf War in 1991 created a safe haven for the PKK to launch attacks against Turkey. The Turkish military, in turn, carried out its own operations to wipe out terrorist cells across the border.

In what was perceived as a highly insecure environment in the 1990s, Turkey sought alliances with Israel against its Middle Eastern neighbors and emphasized the use of military force. This type of foreign policy put the military at the center stage as the key decision-maker.[48] Except for brief interludes (such as President Turgut Özal's almost unilateral decision to participate in the Gulf War), elected officials and civil society seldom held the upper hand in foreign policy decisions.

These characteristics of Turkish foreign policy, however, started to change after 1999.[49] Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and former advisor of the Prime Minister, stated that "since 2002, Turkey has pursued zero problem policy toward [its] neighbors," which is based on trust and cooperation in economic and political spheres.[50] This type of friendly relations has also been translated into an active role in neighboring regions. Turkey has played mediation and peace-maker roles in the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East. Davutoğlu emphasizes "rhythmic diplomacy" as a key component of this new foreign policy. Turkey has participated in and hosted several international meetings, with an attempt to "gain… more influence in international organizations."[51] Indeed, Turkey became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2009–10 term. These changes have also increased the influence of the government, parliament, and civil society organizations in decision-making.[52] Even though the military and the ministry of foreign affairs still play critical roles, a new *modus vivendi* has been reached between the armed forces and the civilian government.[53]

Compared to Turkish foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War period, the new stance of Turkey in the international arena fits with the EU norms better.[54] In the past, the Turkish military enjoyed greater leverage in determining foreign policy and had more say than its counterparts in Europe. This, however, gradually changed after 1999, when the European Union accession process started to affect the powers of the military in Turkish democracy and hence its involvement in foreign policy decision-making.

The primary way the EU influenced Turkish politics was through the prospect of EU membership and enlargement negotiations, i.e. the "procedural diffusion" of EU norms.[55] The reform packages that were adopted in order to meet the EU condition-ality in accordance with the EU accession criteria, also affected the role of the military in foreign and domestic policy. Especially critical were the changes made to limit the power of the National Security Council (NSC).[56] The 2001 amendment package changed the role of the cabinet vis-à-vis the NSC. While in the past the cabinet was required to "give priority consideration" to the decisions of the NSC, now it is obligated only to "evaluate" the "advice" of the Council.[57] Further changes in the Constitution in July 2003 increased the powers of the civilians relative to the military representatives in the NSC. The secretary general of the NSC, who had previously been a military officer, was replaced by a civilian and his powers were reduced. The number of civilians working in the under-secretariat was increased relative to the military officers and finally the regular meetings of the NSC were reduced from once a month to once every two months.[58] These reforms did not radically change the role of the military in Turkish politics and, from 2004 to 2007, it seemed that the armed forces reacquired their previous dominance.[59] Yet, in foreign policy decision-making, these reforms coincided with the increasing role of civilian groups and the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy.

Since the Cold War, "EU security culture has put emphasis on soft governance, common security practices and the need for non-military responses."[60] Turkish security culture, on the other hand, had been realist and based on perceptions of

threat from domestic and international actors.[61] This "military-focused and state-centric" approach necessitated the use of more coercive, hard-line tools to solve conflicts. These perceptions and use of means, however, began to alter after 1999. This transformation was visible in the way Turkey dealt with its Middle Eastern neighbors, the Cyprus dispute, and Greek-Turkish relations.

The Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy from this angle could be analyzed by looking at the changes in Turkish foreign policy with regards to its Middle East neighbors, as these changes seem to illustrate the increased use of diplomatic/economic instruments versus military means. This is also an important empirical support to our Proposition II. Turkey's relations, especially with Iraq and Syria, have been seen as high politics, involving major threats to national interests, specifically with respect to the Kurdish terrorism. This issue involves Turkish national unity and a complicated combination of domestic, identity, and foreign politics. This is why we would expect to see the least amount of changes in Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq in particular, since threat perceptions against national interests would be particularly high in this case. Accordingly, any change from military to diplomatic/economic instruments in the way Turkey deals with Iraq would provide strong evidence of Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy.

Foreign Policy toward Iraq and Syria

It is possible to argue that Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq until 1999 revolved around PKK terrorism and the military aspect of this question. Turkey's problems with the PKK were aggravated by the creation of the northern no-flight zone in Iraq after the Gulf War. This strengthened the PKK and allowed it to establish bases across the border. The security approach firmly argued that, for any viable solution in southeast Turkey, the armed forces must first defeat the PKK. According to the military line, once terrorism is eliminated, "economic and social programs… would resolve the problems of the region."[62] Thus, diplomatic and economic instruments could not produce a solution until the PKK operatives were detained and its bases in Northern Iraq were destroyed.

The PKK problem is one major field in which there has been a Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy since the late 1990s. An important precipitator of EU influence was the relative decrease in the power of the terrorist organization. In 1998, Syria had to deport Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, after the Turkish state coerced and threatened war against its neighbor. Öcalan fled to Italy, which led Turkey to exert considerable pressure on its NATO ally. The leader of the PKK was finally deported from Italy too, and was captured while being relocated from the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. After his arrest, Öcalan called for a cease-fire, which effectively ended PKK terrorism for three years.

By 1999, as the prospects for Turkish membership in the EU had increased, the Turkish governments carried out several important reforms in order to give more domestic rights to the Kurdish minority. In August 2002, broadcasting and private education became available in Kurdish. Also in the same year, death penalty in

Turkey was abolished. Even though rejecting death penalty was a significant application of an EU norm in itself, it was also a major development because it resolved the question of whether or not the captured leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was going to be executed. After the November 2002 elections, the newly elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) accelerated the reform process and strengthened the economic and diplomatic approach further by enacting six additional constitutional packages and revising the penal code. These amendments, among others, put into operation the previously ratified reforms. As a result, Turkish radio and television started to broadcast some Kurdish programs and in 2009 a new Kurdish TV channel was launched. Several local TV and radio stations also began broadcasting. In addition, in several primary schools, children were given the opportunity to learn Kurdish.[63] Even though, these changes were mostly in domestic politics, it became possible to see their application in foreign policy objectives as well.

It is possible to claim that from 1999 until 2004, the European norms on minority and human rights seemed to have gradually diffused into Turkey. The process, however, had a set back when, in 2004, the PKK resumed its activities and carried out several destructive attacks against the Turkish armed forces and the civilian population in the southeast. The most violent attacks against the security forces occurred first in October 2007, in Hakkari, Dağlıca and in May 2008 in Aktütün. These attacks were followed by assaults against civilians on January 3, 2008 in Diyarbakır, killing two high school students and several other civilians.[64] With the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, the prospects for an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq seems to have increased. In addition, the power vacuum in the region allowed PKK fighters to cross the border to Turkey more frequently. Turkey grew increasingly anxious that an autonomous Kurdish entity would be established in northern Iraq and control the oil-rich Kerkük. In October 2003 the Turkish Parliament authorized the military to carry out operations in the region. Consequently, since fall 2007 the Turkish military has crossed the border and attacked PKK bases several times, marking the continued influence of military instruments.

However, despite these military operations, Turkish foreign policy toward northern Iraq has changed in important ways. In fact, according to Davutoğlu, one of the main principles of the new Turkish foreign policy is to find "a balance between security and democracy." Seen from this perspective, it is significant that "the Turkish military pursued… military operation[s] against terrorist formations in Iraq several weeks, with no negative impact on liberties in Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakir, or Van".[65] Indeed, after 2004, important diplomatic and economic instruments were introduced into Turkish foreign policy. Turkey gradually came to accept the federal structure in Iraq and the Turkish government started to engage in dialogue with the Kurdish administration in Erbil and the government in Bagdad. In July 2008, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited his Iraqi counterpart and met with Jalal Talabani, the President of Iraq, who is also a Kurd. Erdoğan and Talabani signed a strategic partnership agreement, which envisioned the creation of a high council and regular meetings between presidents, prime ministers, and technical delegations.[66]

The two countries also took important steps in dealing with terrorism. In his visit to Ankara in December 2008, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri El-Maliki declared that Iraq was ready to cooperate with Turkey in its fight against PKK terrorism.[67] Similarly, in March 2009, Talabani came to Turkey in an official visit and provided assurances that an independent Kurdish state would not be formed. The Turkish president Abdullah Gül returned Talabani's visit and, in what would have been an unthinkable trip a decade earlier, he referred to northern Iraq as "Kurdistan."[68]

Similar contacts with the Kurdish administration in Erbil were initiated several years earlier. Since 2004, special representatives from Turkey have frequently traveled to the region and "the Chief of Turkish Intelligence [have] paid visits especially to Kurdish leaders."[69] One of the high profile visits was made in May 2008, when a delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with the prime minister of the Kurdish regional government, Nechirvan Barzani. Similarly, in October 2008, a Turkish delegation traveled to Baghdad to meet with the president of the Kurdish administration, Massoud Barzani, who in turn visited Ankara in early June 2010. In these meetings the two sides explored the possibility of cooperating against the PKK.[70] This fits well with the Europeanization of foreign policy as diplomatic measures are now being increasingly used instead of military instruments. Such dialogue and diplomacy between Kurdish leaders and Turkey also help isolate the PKK, even though concrete results are not yet discernable on this issue and, in light of the recent resurge in PKK activities, it is clear that the terrorist organization has not been weakened as was initially thought.

Cooperation among Iraq's neighbors, since it integrates the country with its region, indirectly serves the purpose of isolating the PKK as well. In this realm, Turkey took the initiative and hosted the meeting of Extended Neighboring Countries of Iraq in November 2007. In this meeting, Turkey agreed to cooperate with Iraq's Arab neighbors in a forum for the purposes of involving regional powers with the future of the country.[71] Such diplomatic contacts with the Kurdish administration, Iraqi government, and other regional neighbors are important indicators that Turkish foreign policy is changing and increasingly adapting to European norms.

As our Proposition II states, the use of economic instruments in Iraq is another important indicator of Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish companies have extensively invested in Iraq and engaged in important projects. In 2005, more than 80 Turkish companies invested in initiatives worth US\$1.5 billion in Iraq.[72] Some of these undertakings include the American Embassy, the Suleimania University, the international airport in Erbil, and several highways.[73] In 2010, the volume of trade between Turkey and Iraq stood at around \$6 billion.[74] Given that in 2002 there were no official records of trade with Iraq, this sudden increase in economic cooperation is quite significant for relations between the two countries and for Turkish economy. Indeed, exports to Iraq exceed imports by a wider margin than Turkey's trade relations with other neighbors. The economic exchange with Iraq supports the revitalization of Turkey's southeast regions and helps combat terrorism in these Kurdish-dominated areas.[75] Business activities also facilitate indirect mechanisms of diplomatic exchange. A few Turkish entrepreneurs and

especially some members of the Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB) have developed close contacts with the Kurdish leadership. In 2005, businessmen played a critical role in reaching an agreement between the two entities on over-flight rights to Kurdistan Airlines and direct flights between Turkey and northern Iraq.[76]

This is why we claim that the new Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq can be characterized as a mix of continued use of military means and increasing use of diplomatic and economic instruments. Military operations still continue, but Turkey seeks more multilateral backing in its efforts against the PKK, including demands from the US against the PKK camps in the region.[77] It is significant that both prior and after some of the military operations, Turkey has sought diplomatic solutions. Ankara tries to maintain close relations with the government in Baghdad and the Kurdish administration in Erbil. Encouraging developments in the economic sphere and the involvement of civil society groups, such as businessmen, imply that both foreign policy goals and decision-makers have changed significantly. In a nutshell, Turkish policy towards Iraq is based on political dialogue, economic interdependence, and cultural coexistence.[78] All of these are important indicators that Turkish foreign policy has been increasingly Europeanized, even in a case where we would least expect to see these changes.

It is also significant that the Turkish Armed Forces seem to be on board with the new foreign policy outlook. Decisions of the National Security Council have promoted the further development of economic and trade ties with Turkey's neighbors, including Iraq. Increasing commercial relations has been seen by the military as another way to enhance security and foreign policy goals. As a professor of Turkish foreign policy, Kemal Kirişçi, rightly notes, "the fact that [trade with northern Iraq] benefited the local Kurdish population on both sides of the frontier and that there was a risk that the PKK might abuse the trade [has been] overlooked for reasons of pragmatism."[79]

Similarly, the military has conceded to the need to forge diplomatic ties with the northern Iraqi administration. In October 2005, the then Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök recognized the authorities of Talabani and Barzani by saying that they were not tribal leaders anymore, but had become the presidents of Iraq and northern Iraq, respectively. Özkök implied that, since Turkey officially recognizes Iraq, it also has to acknowledge the changing circumstances and the new Iraqi constitution, which strengthens a federal structure.[80] The Turkish military believes that effective dissolution of the PKK can be achieved if the administration in northern Iraq also shares the same goal.[81] Since the role of the Kurdish administration is critical, cooperation with Erbil can also be acceptable and even desirable.

The support of the Turkish Armed Forces of the new foreign policy toward Iraq complements the military's endorsement for Turkish accession to the European Union. In the words of former Deputy Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt, "the Turkish Armed Forces cannot be against the European Union because the European Union is the geopolitical and geostrategic ultimate condition for the realization of the target of modernization which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk chose for the Turkish nation."[82] As frequently stated by the military hierarchy, the armed forces see the European Union

as an important means to Turkish modernization and Westernization.[83] In this context, EU membership is an important goal and fundamental pillar of Turkish foreign policy. The military's willingness to accommodate changes in foreign policy and to adapt to EU norms and instruments should be seen within this EU membership perspective. These declarations and the military's position seem to provide evidence for our Proposition II, with the increased emphasis on economic and diplomatic measures empirically supported.

While the military's stance toward northern Iraq is remarkable, its changing attitudes toward Syria are also highly significant. In June 2002, during the visit of Syrian chief of the general staff to Turkey, the two sides signed a military training agreement, which consisted of "mutual exchange of military personnel, mutual invitations for monitoring war games, and military training."[84] On April 27, 2009, Turkey and Syria started two-day military exercises. According to the official declaration by the Turkish Armed Forces, the main purposes of the exercises were "to strengthen the friendship, cooperation, and trust between the two land forces and increase the level of education and collaboration between the border troops."[85] İlker Başbuğ, chief of staff, affirmed his support for the exercises when Turkey's long-term ally in the Middle East, Israel, criticized the maneuvers. In what can only be described as a historical statement, Başbuğ declared that "Israel's reaction does not concern us."[86] In the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was centered on "Turkey-United States-Israel triangle."[87] This was partially a response to common perceptions of threat from rogue states in the region, including Syria.[88] Therefore, the new willingness of the military to work together with the Syrian land forces is an important indicator of how significantly Turkish foreign policy toward its neighbors has changed.

The military exercises are, in fact, just one example of cooperative relations between Syria and Turkey. After Syria deported Öcalan, the two countries signed the Adana Accords in October 1998 to enhance security relations. Syria agreed to close down PKK training camps and to cease its logistical support to the organization. Following the signing of the accords, representatives from the military and diplomatic corps of both sides visited each other in confidence-building meetings. In June 2000, the Turkish president went to Syria to attend the funeral of Hafiz al-Asad.[89] Similar high-level visits followed. In January 2004, Basher al-Asad became the first president to visit Turkey since Syria's independence from France.[90] His gesture was followed by Erdoğan's trip to Damascus later that year. Such meetings between the heads of government scaled down the intensity of important conflicts of the past, namely the sharing of Tigris and Euphrates waters and border disputes over the Turkish southern province of Hatay. Thus, there was a visible change in the increased use of diplomatic tools rather than the implicit threat of force in Turkey's foreign policy towards Syria.

It is possible to argue that Turkey sees its relations with Syria as an opening to good relations with other Arab countries and an integral part of Turkish mediation in the Middle East. Turkey wants to use its "soft power" to enhance security in the region, which includes facilitating international dialogue with Iran[91] and the construction of stability in Iraq. For this purpose, Turkey tried to mediate between

Israel and Syria, and cooperated with Syria in the Iraqi neighborhood forum. Damascus and Ankara are both concerned with the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the possibility of an independent state in northern Iraq. Syria has a significant Kurdish population, which has a potential to engage in collection action against Damascus.[92] As Basher al-Asad emphasized during Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit in December 2006 "Turkey and Syria have common views on regional issues and… [Syria] appreciates Turkey's efforts to restore peace in the Middle East."[93]

In economic relations, as well, Syria and Turkey have started to cooperate more. From 1995 to 2004, commercial exchange between the two countries increased 50 percent.[94] The free trade agreement was signed in 2004 and the gradual clearing of mines across the border serve to improve trade relations.[95] Consequently, in only one year, from 2006 to 2007, trade between Turkey and Syria increased from $797 million to $1.2 billion.[96] In 2009, the volume of trade reached $2 billion, with the potential to increase to $5 billion in the subsequent three years.[97] Turkey hopes that such business activities will boost the development of southeast provinces and help combat terrorism in the Kurdish-populated regions.

In short, both with respect to Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq and Syria, one can observe significant changes, mostly with respect to increased use of diplomatic and economic tools, rather than military instruments. This is an important finding for our Proposition II and a positive answer to our research questions on the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy as a result of the EU membership incentive. In addition, there is a change even in the military's position towards these countries, which were only a decade ago classified as security threats to Turkey. The increased cooperation between the military and the government is also indicative of the changes that come with Europeanization.

Conclusion

This paper argues that since 1999 there has been a gradual Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, specifically in the procedural changes and the increased use of diplomatic and economic instruments in line with Propositions I and II. First, the visible changes and reforms in the civil-military relations in domestic policy-making were important in terms of their reflection onto the foreign policy-making arena. Second, we are able to witness a change in Turkish foreign policy specifically with respect to the increased use of diplomatic and economic instruments, as opposed to the use of military instruments. In short, both propositions seem to be empirically supported by our analysis. These changes in Turkish foreign policy could also be seen in the unlikely case of Turkey's stance towards the Middle Eastern neighbors, specifically towards Iraq and Syria.

Our paper has demonstrated that it is possible to use Europeanization as an analytical tool in the foreign policy field even in an area where Europeanization seems to be most problematic, for candidate states on second pillar issues. There have been several important steps on this issue that suggest the diffusion of EU norms to candidate countries. The increased emphasis on diplomatic measures, changes in the

foreign policy decision-making mechanisms with a lesser role for the military, and participation in common foreign policy objectives could all be listed among such steps. For example, Turkey participated in the EU-led operations drawing upon NATO assets and initially contributed troops and material to the EU's Rapid Reaction Force. However, Turkish elites have been skeptical of NATO-EU strategic cooperation. Problems arose when it became possible for Cyprus to access NATO assets in Kosovo. Turkey withdrew from the Headline Goal as a response. This demonstrates the fragility of the joint decision-making norm and coordination reflex on foreign and security matters in Turkey. However, one should note that this is also the case for the EU members where some EU members might be skeptical of certain CFSP decisions in line with their perceived interests. This is also the case with Turkey, when Cyprus was not involved in EU-NATO operations, Turkey was a willing participant, adopting the EU norms on joint action. However, when the threat that Cyprus might gain access to NATO assets increased, Turkey raised objections. We have demonstrated that Europeanization is most likely when it furthers the perceived material interests of the candidate country. This could be interpreted as an answer to our second research question with respect to the limits of Europeanization. This finding is in tandem with the Europeanization literature for both candidate countries and member states, i.e., utilitarian concerns, are keys to understand candidate countries' norm compliance and/or adaptation to EU standards.

Our paper demonstrates that Europeanization of foreign policy is possible for acceding countries where the candidate countries adjust to the EU's norms on foreign policy and common rules of behavior. Specifically, because Europeanization in the second pillar, which is intergovernmental, is problematic even for member states, this paper tries to uncover whether the EU seems to have an impact on foreign policy changes in Turkey, both procedurally and on a norm-based perspective. Our analysis and findings are important in highlighting changes in Turkish foreign policy and its increased Europeanization. This, does not, mean that there were no other factors that influenced these changes in Turkish foreign policy but only that we focused solely on the possible impact of the EU. This is why this paper constitutes an addendum to Europeanization literature. The paper raises further questions to be explored, such as the linkages between domestic and foreign policy-making, the role of norms in foreign policy in general as well as the ability of the EU to take upon a global role for itself.

Acknowledgements

Notes

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