Regime Change in the Aegean after the Second World War: Reconsidering Foreign Influence

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Abstract

In the extant literatures in Greece and Turkey, scholars argue that the Colonels’ junta of 1967 and the 1950 Turkish transition to democracy were brought about by foreign influence. This is, however, a paradox since the same Cold War international context is seen as the cause of contrary regimes in two neighboring countries that belonged to the same alliance. A comparative study of Greece and Turkey shows that external factors played a more indirect role than what many scholars maintain and altered the cost-benefit analyses of the political leaders. In Greece, American aid to the military decreased the costs of intervention. The Cold War context intensified fears that there was a leftist threat in Greece and augmented the perceived benefits and legitimacy of authoritarianism. Conversely, in Turkey, the difficulties encountered during the Second World War increased the costs of sustaining authoritarianism. The Turkish desire to be included in the Western camp during the Cold War legitimized domestic demands for democracy and increased the benefits associated with regime change.

According to the conventional view held by most Greek sources, the United States was involved in the establishment of the 1967 Greek junta and helped sustain it.1 Similarly, in the existing literature on the 1950 Turkish transition to democracy, scholars maintain that one of the main determinants of democratization was the desire to become part of the Western alliance.2 Thus, ironically, the new world order set out by the U.S. at the end of the Second World War is seen as the cause of diametrically opposed regimes in two neighboring countries belonging to the same alliance. In Greece, it is seen as responsible for an authoritarian regime whereas in Turkey it is believed to be the cause of democracy.

What, then, was the real effect of U.S. foreign policy and the international context in the Greek and Turkish regimes? How great a role did foreign factors play in Turkish democratization and Greek
military intervention? I argue that domestic dynamics were the main determinants of regime change in both countries, although external variables still played important roles in affecting the outcomes. Foreign dynamics influenced the calculations of ruling elites and, in combination with the circumstances at home, altered the cost-benefit analysis of the domestic actors. Especially critical in this regard was the impact of foreign factors on the power and role of the military in both Greek and Turkish society.

The type of cost-benefit analysis employed here is similar to what Robert Dahl calls the costs of toleration and suppression (1971). According to Dahl’s renowned axiom, “the more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime” (1971:15). In other words, in an authoritarian regime similar to the Turkish single-party rule, the likelihood of a transition to democracy increases when it becomes costly to exclude opposition groups from the political system (O’Donnell 1973:89). Usually the costs of sustaining the regime increase when new and stronger political actors appear with new interests and demands for autonomous representation in the political system. The emergence of these groups changes the balance of power and affects the capacity of the authoritarian rulers to repress the opposition.

The probability of multi-party politics is enhanced even further if, at the same time as changes occur in the costs of repression, the government feels secure vis-à-vis the new opposition and the costs of toleration are not high. If the opponent is not perceived as threatening, the benefits of authoritarianism decrease. Thus, when the costs exceed the benefits of a repressive regime, the rulers calculate that a transition to democracy would serve their interests better. At these important junctures, not only the leaders of an authoritarian regime, but also military officers, make similar “Dahlian calculations” (Stepan 1988:67). For the members of the coercive apparatus, if the costs of repression exceed its benefits, they would decide to support (or at least not oppose) the emergence of a competitive regime.

Similar cost-benefit analyses occur prior to transitions to authoritarianism. Before officers stage a coup d’état, like that in Greece in 1967, they make what Samuel Finer calls a “disposition and opportunity calculus” (1988:74–75). The disposition (or the benefit) of an intervention is usually related to how certain interests, such as national, class, corporate, or individual, are perceived by the military officers (Finer 1988:28–53; Nordlinger 1977:63–85). If there is a perception that some or all of these interests are threatened, some officers would be inclined to stage a coup. The opportunity to intervene, on the other hand, is a function of the costs of intervention. If the civilians are weak relative to the armed
forces, the conspirators would perceive the costs of repressing them as low. Economic crises, existence of a power vacuum, loss of legitimacy prior to the coup, or performance failures of the civilian government would strengthen the military’s power relative to that of the civilians (Finer 1988:64–76; Nordlinger 1977:85–95). If the costs of an intervention are lower than the benefits, the likelihood that the conspirators would stage a coup increases. After the military putschists intervene, if their cost-benefit calculus does not significantly change, they would continue to maintain power.

While the costs and benefits of an intervention and sustaining an authoritarian regime are usually determined by domestic dynamics, under some circumstances they might also be influenced by external factors. The Greek and Turkish cases demonstrate two different ways in which international influences might affect cost-benefit analyses and regime outcomes. First, external factors might change the domestic power balance and thereby alter the costs associated with suppression. For instance, if the armed forces receive disproportionate foreign assistance, as in Greece, the costs of a military intervention would be altered. According to historian Charles Tilly:

> the creation of a bipolar, then tripolar world system of states since World War II intensified the competition among great powers for the allegiance of Third World states, and the tendency to leave no part of the Third World neutral. That competition induced the great powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, to provide arms, military training, and military advice to many states. . . . In those states, military organizations grew in size, strength, and efficacy while other organizations stood still or withered. (1992:220)

As with certain Third World countries, the strategic location of Greece led the U.S. to provide aid to the Hellenic military during the Cold War. This increased the power of the armed forces relative to other societal forces and lowered the costs of repression for the Colonels.

In the Turkish case, international factors affected the domestic balance of power and costs of sustaining the authoritarian regime more indirectly. Turkey tried to maintain its neutrality during the Second World War and only at the very last stages joined the Allied powers. Yet, in the case of attack, the single-party government still mobilized troops and took economic measures throughout the 1940s. These domestic policies of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) during World War II led the coalition of political and economic elites to crumble as the latter established an opposition party. At the same time, mobilization for the Second World War revealed the weaknesses of the Turkish armed forces.
Military equipment was outdated and promotion possibilities were limited. This resulted in growing dissatisfaction among the lower ranking officers (Özdağ 1991). Since the regime relied partly on the military, repressing the newly established Democratic Party (DP) became more difficult. As the balance of power shifted to the disadvantage of the RPP, the costs of sustaining the single-party regime increased.

A second way in which the international context influenced the Greek and Turkish cases was through altering the benefits associated with regime change. The threat posed by Turkey’s northern neighbor, the Soviet Union, necessitated an alliance with the democratic Western bloc after the Second World War. The possibility that Turkey might be left out of the Western alliance because of its regime increased the costs associated with authoritarianism and the benefits that a transition to democracy would bring (Yılmaz 2002:76–81). In addition, the need to become a Western ally was used as a legitimizing factor among some members of both the RPP leadership and the DP.

Similar influences of the international context were also evident in Greece. The Cold War context and American resistance to communism gave the Colonels the impression that leftist forces were threatening the Greek sociopolitical system. A further perception that the left must be contained raised the benefits associated with an intervention. It also became an important legitimizing tool in the hands of the Colonels, who justified their authoritarian regime as a reasonable response to the threat of a communist takeover.

**Deconstructing common beliefs on international influences in the Aegean**

On 21 April 1967, a group of middle ranking officers forcibly intervened in Greek politics and established an authoritarian regime that lasted until 1974. There is a strong belief among many Greeks that the 1967 intervention was staged by the United States. The claims of some center-left politicians have perpetuated the notion that the intervention originated at the Greek Central Intelligence Agency, which in the words of Andreas Papandreou was “an administrative and financial appendage of the [American] CIA” (1970:226). According to this argument, the 1967 intervention was necessary to protect the interests of the U.S. in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s southeastern flank because a democratically elected Center Union government would threaten Greece’s ties with the U.S.

It is clear that during these Cold War years, CIA officers and American embassy personnel were in touch with Greek politicians and military officers. The Colonels had contacts in the CIA, since some of them worked...
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at the Greek Intelligence Agency (Katris 1971:45). There is almost no
doubt that Washington did not favor George and Andreas Papandreou,
who in all likelihood would have won the elections scheduled for May
opinions were taken into consideration before significant political actions
that could have an impact on the NATO alliance were decided upon
(Fatouros 1981:239). Given this, the Colonels most certainly calculated
how the Americans would react to a military intervention.

Nonetheless, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the
Americans directly initiated the authoritarian regime (Iatrides 2003:92;
Woodhouse 1985:20). Prior to April 1967, King Constantine asked
the opinion of U.S. Ambassador Philips Talbot about an intervention
prepared by military generals. Ambassador Talbot and the American
administration were against a coup that would prevent the May elec-
tions from taking place under normal democratic procedures. Fearful
that a coup would be staged by the king, the U.S. State Department
ordered the embassy in Athens to mediate between the monarchy and
opposition political leaders (Goldbloom 1972:238–240; Hatzivassiliou
2006:159; Murtagh 1994:110). When it is considered that the American
administration opposed a generals’ coup headed by the King, it becomes
clear that the U.S. could not have supported an intervention by more
junior officers.

The first reaction of the U.S. confirms that the coup was not
expected by the Americans. The administration officially opposed the
action and declared the hope that there would be a return to democ-
ropy. Moreover, the Americans discontinued sending heavy weapons to
Greece and, after the king’s failed coup on 13 December 1967, officially
suspended diplomatic relations. These gestures were symbolic, however,
given that at the time the U.S. could not afford to lose an important
critically situated between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. It
is not surprising that later even these minor signs of opposition were
dropped and shipments of heavy weapon were resumed. The administra-
tion re-established its close ties with Greece, American bases were given
a free hand, and the Sixth Fleet started operating from Greek territory

Yet, it is important to remember that members of the U.S. House
of Representatives and the Senate continued to be critical of the regime.
The attitudes of the administration were not always consistent either. For
instance, heavy weapons shipments were once again suspended at the
beginning of Richard Nixon’s presidential term. Additionally, some Euro-
pean countries, especially the Scandinavian ones, demanded that Greece
be ousted from NATO (Doumas 1968:273–274, 287; Goldbloom 1972:
Thus, there was no unified American and NATO policy toward the regime, even when military aid continued and close ties were forged between the U.S. and the Greek Colonels. With the evidence we currently have, it seems far-fetched to think that the Americans controlled the Colonels to the point of making them intervene in Greek democracy. Moreover, such arguments draw attention away from the real cause of the authoritarian regime and makes it more difficult to assess the true impact of American involvement which was more indirect. The influence of the U.S. was particularly critical in altering the cost-benefit analysis of the domestic decision makers.

Misperceptions regarding the transition to democracy in Turkey also exist. After World War II, the Soviet threat virtually required Turkey to be part of the Western alliance. Furthermore, Turkey wanted to become a member of the United Nations (UN), NATO, and the Council of Europe. Given its neutral position during the war, however, it was not clear if Turkey would be accepted into these international organizations. A number of Turkish officials and members of the intelligentsia believed that liberalization of the authoritarian regime would work in Turkey’s favor and convince the Western powers that the country belonged in the democratic Western camp.

Although this reasoning formed part of the political leaders’ calculations, on its own it could not have effectively required regime change in Turkey. In the years subsequent to the Cold War, it became clear that it was not necessary to have a democratic regime in order to be a Western ally. There were no consistent and long-term international sanctions against authoritarian regimes. As the situation of the Greek authoritarian regime of 1967 clearly demonstrated, the United States did not refrain from allying itself with authoritarian regimes, especially if they opposed Moscow. Similarly, being a democracy was not a precondition for NATO membership. Otherwise, the authoritarian regime of Portugal could not have become a founding member. If democracy was a requisite for alliance with the Americans, then both Spain and Portugal would have been forced to become democracies (Koçak 2003:561). In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that there was any external pressure on Turkey to democratize. President İsmet İnönü, who oversaw the transition to democracy, put it bluntly: “It has often been claimed that democracy in Turkey was introduced as a consequence of the pressures the victors of the Second World War exercised on Turkey. This is not true . . . I had indicated my plans to install a multi-party regime in Turkey [several years earlier]” (Heper 1998:10ff48).

The international influences argument in Turkey does not hold in terms of timing either. Even though the first multi-party elections in
1946 might have been necessary to convince the West that Turkey was in the same camp, there was no such need in 1950, when the actual transition took place with the DP’s electoral victory. By that time Turkey was already a member of the UN and the U.S. President, Harry Truman, had already delivered his famous speech promising military and economic aid to Turkey. In fact, there were signs that the U.S. would provide support to Turkey even before the 1946 elections. This suggests that even if Turkey had not made a transition to democracy in 1950, it could have still forged an alliance with the U.S. International concerns were not strong enough to lead to democratization absent independent domestic dynamics favoring such change.

International influences on the costs of repression and balance of domestic power

Despite the need for caution when applying international influence arguments to the Greek and Turkish cases, more indirect effects must still be recognized. In Greece, one of the main external influences on the transition to authoritarian regime was American military aid and training, which created strong and autonomous armed forces. The Colonels staged a coup in April 1967 using the equipment, skills, and contingency plans from the time of the Greek Civil War and the ensuing Cold War. Years of American and NATO aid kept the military more powerful than the opposition groups. This lowered the costs of intervention for the Colonels, who controlled the resources of the armed forces. Military aid continued after the coup d’état, this time helping the Colonels to sustain their regime.

Military assistance to Greece began during the Greek Civil War, which flared up after the Axis powers left the country at the end of the Second World War. The main opponents were the right-wing Athens government and the communists who had established the leading resistance organization, EAM/ELAS, against the occupation. The first conflict between the two forces took place in Athens in December 1944. With the extensive involvement of the British, this first round of conflict resulted in a right-wing victory (Couloumbis, Petropulos, and Psomiades 1976:109–111). The communist forces were repulsed from Athens and a peace agreement was signed in February 1945. However, fighting resumed one year later, and this time the Athens government had more American than British support. The U.S. commitment to Greece increased, especially after 1947 when President Truman promised military aid and economic assistance.5

American assistance during the war partially took the form of
civilian aid which allowed the right-wing to provide welfare benefits and agricultural credits and to increase state employment opportunities. These measures improved the popularity of the Athens government relative to the leftist forces. In constant U.S. dollars, American economic assistance to Greece amounted to $5,527,000 and direct military aid to $2,541,600 (see Table 1). The Hellenic armed forces received approximately 160,000 small-arms weapons, 4,000 mortar and artillery pieces, mine detectors, and radios from the U.S. Foreign aid granted much-needed weapons to fight the war and also helped rebuild and expand the regular army from around 90,000 soldiers in 1946 to approximately 120,000 in 1947. At the end of the Civil War, 150,000 men served in the army alone, as opposed to a maximum of no more than 15,000 communist forces (Close 1995:200, 214–216; Veremis 1997:146–147, 150).

At the beginning of the war, Britain was responsible for training new military recruits and providing tactical advice. After October 1947, the United States took the initiative and the Greek military received strategic guidance on how to conduct the war from the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG). American consultants sat in the supreme council of national defense meetings and sometimes even joined Greek senior officers in combat (Close 1995:216; Veremis 1997:148). In fact, American interference in Greek domestic matters went beyond military advice during this period and included decisions regarding “the selection of cabinet members, the timing of national elections . . . and . . . the orientation of foreign policy” (Iatrides 1977:249–250). American penetration was so extensive that the U.S. ambassador and the chief of the American economic mission competed with each other for power in Greek domestic matters (Iatrides 1983:159–160). Ultimately, British and American involvement in Greece made it possible for the right wing to prevail in the Civil War. Such support also secured an autonomous and assertively anti-communist military equipped with new tactics on how to fight internal enemies (Alivizatos 1978).

In the 1950s, Greece became a secure ally of the West and recipi-

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Table 1. U.S. Economic and Military Aid to Greece (in millions, constant 2006 $U.S.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Economic Assistance</th>
<th>Military Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946–1949</td>
<td>5,527.00</td>
<td>2,541.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–1959</td>
<td>5,807.70</td>
<td>5,917.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1966</td>
<td>1,399.10</td>
<td>3,712.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967–1974</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td>3,024.90</td>
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Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
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ent of aid as one of the members of NATO. In the 1950s, the amount of economic and military aid from the U.S. seemed relatively balanced, $5,807,700 and $5,917,700 respectively (see Table 1). This sense of balance was, however, spurious. Until 1962, economic assistance included aid for defense which was designed to build up the military indirectly through sustaining a healthier economy that could support larger defense expenditures (Mott 1999:292–293). In other words, from 1953 until 1962, significant portions of economic assistance were devoted to strengthening the Hellenic armed forces rather than reinforcing the power of civilian enterprises. Thanks in part to this kind of aid, Greece sustained relatively high defense expenditures (about 6.4% of the GNP) between 1952 and 1962. One unfavorable consequence of this military aid was that Greece became almost totally dependent on it. When it was finally cut in 1962, the Greek government reacted fiercely and claimed that the number of men in the armed forces would have to be scaled down (Hatzivassiliou 2006:88–94, 152–154). Despite the pleas of Greek officials, there was a sharp decline in economic assistance after 1956 and, between 1960 and 1966, military aid was more than double the amount of economic assistance for other projects (see Table 1).

In the post-war era, besides providing monetary assistance, Western powers were involved in the training of Greek military personnel. Between 1950 and 1969, a total of 11,229 Greek military officers went to the U.S. for education purposes and close to 2,000 students received training in overseas NATO installations. In NATO schools, officers were taught not only military tactics but also political science, sociology, economics, and psychology. It is safe to assume that some of these officers were indoctrinated against communism and, given their extensive education, came to believe that they could protect the country from internal enemies better than politicians could. As there were 11,000 officers in the Greek armed forces at this time, we can safely assume that a significant portion of the officer corps received foreign training (Couloumbis, Petropulos, and Psomiades 1976:126; Danopoulos 1984:27; Doumas 1968:269; Veremis 1997:155).

As Theodore Couloumbis argues, in the post–Cold War years, the imbalance in foreign support for the military and other social forces “have contributed to the hypertrophy of the Greek military establishment compared to the relative atrophy of political structures such as political parties, trade unions, and other pressure groups” (1974:353). No significant changes took place in the asymmetrical treatment of Greek domestic forces after the Colonels intervened in April 1967; if anything, it became worse. American economic assistance was completely cut off after 1968, while military assistance during the authoritarian regime
amounted to $3,024,900 (see Table 1). Even though the U.S. cut the delivery of heavy weapons at first in order to show its disapproval of the authoritarian regime, it continued providing light weapons and later resumed the shipment of heavy weapons. These armaments were actually easier to use against internal opponents, and thus, the U.S. policy did not shift the domestic balance of power significantly (Couloumbis, Petropulos, and Psomiades 1976:136; Goldbloom 1972:242). This type of disproportionate attention to the military is also evident in the number of American personnel stationed in Greece. In 1970, of the 3,000 Americans dealing with military matters in Greece, only 210 did not work for the Department of Defense (Couloumbis, Petropulos, and Psomiades 1976:126–127; Murtagh 1994:19).

A clear indication of the salience of American influence in keeping the military stronger than the rest of society was how the insurgent Colonels took over the government. On the day of the coup, a small group of middle-rank officers, using a NATO-designed plan entitled Prometheus, which was to be used only in case of a communist takeover or war with a communist country, overthrew the democratically-elected government of the country. The plan spelled out how communists and other suspects could be quickly arrested and how airfields and radio and other communications facilities could be seized. No real mobilization of the military was necessary for the plan to work properly. Lieutenant General Gregorios Spandidakis was enlisted to announce to army units that the Prometheus plan was in force (Papandreou 1970:227–228; Sulzberger 1970:305; Woodhouse 1985:22–25). As the Chief of the General Staff of the army, Spandidakis had great credibility and conveyed the impression that the military actions were being undertaken and supported by the army hierarchy. Because under Prometheus all military units knew what they were required to do, the insurgency succeeded in only a few hours. The Colonels only controlled the tanks, military police, and military schools in Athens, so without Prometheus, the Colonels would have had to mobilize other key military units (Athenian 1972:66). In order for each unit to know what they had to do in advance, a larger plan with more participants would have been necessary since the Colonels did not enjoy widespread support within the military. There was a good chance that the mutiny would falter had it not been for Prometheus and the NATO training which made the plan familiar and readily accessible to the insurgents (Athenian 1972:66–67).

After World War II, the Hellenic armed forces were equipped and trained by NATO countries, especially the United States. When the Greek Colonels decided to intervene, they had the necessary plans, skills, and weaponry to keep the costs of suppression low. Similarly, in
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Turkey international influences changed the domestic balance of power. Although in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, American interference in Turkey was not as extensive as it was in Greece (Iatrides 1977:250–251); international factors still had an indirect impact in altering the domestic balance of power. As Alfred Stepan argues:

In a struggle for democracy, the relationship of power in an authoritarian regime depend, on the one hand, on the regime’s capacity to lead its allies and to maintain the unity of its coercive apparatus, and on the other hand, on the capacity of the democratic opposition to constitute itself and to generate support for a ruling alternative. (1988:55)

In Turkey, international influences broke apart the regime’s alliances and its coercive apparatus. Previous supporters of the regime established an opposition party in 1946 and started to demand democracy.

One of the main policies of the authoritarian RPP government in Turkey during the Second World War was to remain neutral and refrain from entering the war on either side. President İsmet İnönü and his colleagues strongly believed that, in case of an attack, Turkey would be overrun within days. In anticipation of such an unfortunate circumstance, Turkey mobilized its troops, but aware of the military’s weaknesses, expected “sacrifice, effort, cooperation, and patience” from the citizens (VanderLippe 2005:53). The devotion of the citizens to the homeland was put to the test in 1940 with the Law of National Defense. This law increased taxes, introduced price controls, obligated forced labor for workers and peasants, rationed basic commodities, and legalized the confiscation of private enterprises, especially in the textile, cement, and mining sectors. At the beginning of the war, the state attempted to control almost every economic activity with the aim of generating revenue for the military and preventing scarcity in the cities (Boratav 1982:215–268; Koçak 2003:371–424).

Contrary to expectations, however, the policies of the new law led to widespread shortages and a huge black market (VanderLippe 2005:66–73). Because the RPP could not handle rationing properly and prevent hoarding of scarce goods, from 1938 to 1943 inflation increased 490.1% (Yetkin 1983:183–184; also see Koçak 2003:434). As people suffered from war-time difficulties, they started to blame the RPP for its policies and the economic elites for using the state’s policies to their own advantage. Indeed, the war had created its own nouveau riche merchants who stockpiled produce and accumulated wealth by selling goods at favorable prices on the black market. Close to 2,000 commercial companies were established in Istanbul and the number of large enterprises increased substantially in Izmir (Timur 2003:26ff;
In rural areas, large landowners provided loans to small peasants, and when they could not repay their debts, confiscated their lands (VanderLippe 2005:86). These landowners were also able to amass and sell excess produce on the black market, which contributed to their wealth (Koçak 2003:440–441).

The RPP made several attempts to regain the allegiance of the masses and increase revenue for mobilization. Efforts were particularly directed at taxing the groups that gained from war-time policies. In 1942, the state introduced a capital levy which was supposed to be collected from wealthy families, but in practice was taken almost exclusively from the Greek and Jewish minorities (Ökte 1951; Karpat 1959:114–117). In 1944, the state confiscated the machinery of some factories in Istanbul and Eskisehir and introduced a 10% agricultural produce tax (Yetkin 1983:188). In 1945, the RPP introduced land reform that would distribute lands larger than 500 hectares to landless peasants. These reforms specified that there would not be landholdings greater than five hectares in some regions (Karpat 1959:117–118).

Ultimately, excessive state intervention in business and agriculture did not help with the problems of the masses and increased grievances among the elite, resulting in demands from both groups for both economic and political liberalization. In 1945, several RPP members, including landowners and politicians close to business circles, appealed to the party for policy changes. When their demands were not met, they established the DP with the direct participation of the landowners and financial support from the business elite (Timur 2003:14–21; Karpat 1959:316–317). The new party quickly gained support among the peasants and workers, who had been burdened by government policies during the war. Even though the establishment of the DP cannot be equated with the transition to democracy in Turkey, the fact that the RPP could not effectively repress the DP and prevent its rise was an important step toward transition in 1950 when the Democrats won the elections.

Indeed, the opposition of the economic elites and the creation of the new party increased RPP’s costs of sustaining the regime. During the 1920s and 1930s, the military was the main repressive organ of the state and supported RPP reforms (Harris 1965:55–56; Özdag 1991:43–121; Tunçay 1999). Such military cooperation was again needed if the RPP decided to suppress the DP. Yet, World War II also led to grievances among military officers. First, military mobilization for the war revealed the backwardness of the Turkish army; military equipment was old and necessary supplies were insufficient, causing soldiers to starve and be transferred within the country without motorized vehicles (Hale 1994:79;
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In addition, lower-ranking officers complained about their promotion prospects. The hierarchy of the military was so much entrenched that the members of the board of high commanders chosen for the Second World War were the same generals who fought the War of Independence after the First World War. Worsening the situation still more, a number of laws were enacted in the 1940s which made it possible for high-ranking officers to continue their service in the military while postponing the promotions of the lower ranking soldiers (Özdağ 1991:140–141, 154–156).

Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, was retired in 1944 after serving in the same position for 22 years. This decision was rumored to have been taken due to his political views. Contrary to the government’s pro-Allies policies, Çakmak had pro-Axis and German sympathies (Hale 1994:82). Despite this political reasoning, his and other senior staff’s retirements might still have been welcomed by the junior officers. Yet, the subsequent replacements were about the same age and seniority, and, as a result, did not alter the promotion system or the prospects of junior officers. Mobilization for the Second World War revealed these shortcomings in the armed forces, leading to resentment among junior officers.

Finally, the autonomy and powers of the armed forces were curtailed in order to centralize decision making during the war. In 1940, the authority to execute decisions of martial law commanders was transferred from the military to the police forces. In 1944, the office of the Chief of Staff became responsible to the Prime Minister and in 1949 it was subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense. The important functions of the Chief of Staff (such as military appointments, maneuvers, and education) were either delegated to the ministry or came under its supervision (Hale 1994:83, 93; Harris 1965:62–63, 65; Özdağ 1991:144–146, 157). These policies did not just affect the lower-ranking officers, but the entire military as an institution.

As a result of these threats to the military’s corporate interests, secret organizations began to form among the lower ranking officers. Their main aim during World War II was to fight against the promotional bottleneck plaguing the Turkish armed forces. After the war, and with the creation of the DP, these organizations changed their agenda and lent their support to the new party. Their leaders met with opposition politicians and decided to intervene if the RPP refused to step down after the 1950 elections. On the other hand, President İsmet İnönü obtained assurance from a few higher ranking officers that if he wished, the military would intervene against the DP. In response, the DP got the
word from its own supporters that the military was not under the control of the RPP (Belen 1971:32–33; Hale 1994:91–93; Koçaş 1977:147–159; İpekçi and Coşar 1965:11–24; Özdağ 1991:141–144, 164–168). As George Harris notes, “this behind-the-scenes maneuvering . . . stimulated the political consciousness of the officer corps” and caused the RPP to lose the unanimous support of the armed forces (1965:64–65). As the alliance that supported the RPP crumbled under the strain of the war, it became more difficult and costly to sustain the authoritarian regime. This increased the costs of repression, since the Republicans had relied on the military to repress rebellions in the past.

**International influences on the benefits of regime change and domestic legitimization**

International conditions changed the balance of power among domestic groups and thereby altered the costs of repression for the Greek Colonels and the Turkish single-party regime. The second type of external effect was the Cold War context which influenced the benefits associated with regime transition. In Greece, the Cold War environment (coupled with Western military training and the legacy of the Civil War) caused the Colonels and the right wing in Greece to perceive the Center Union party (CU) as a leftist threat prior to 1967. This perception increased the benefits linked to a military intervention. This factor was not the only reason that caused the Colonels to intervene, but it was one of the main motivations. The communist threat became a significant justification for military rule and an argument the Colonels used to legitimate their hold on power.

After the Greek Civil War, right-wing political parties, and especially the National Radical Union (NRU), dominated Greek politics. This situation changed in 1961 when a group of parties from the moderate right to the socialists united under the banner of the CU party, headed by George Papandreou. In the 1961 elections, the party won 33.7% of the vote and became the main opposition party. In 1964, more than half of the electorate chose the CU, ending the superiority of the right wing in Greek politics (Clogg 1987:41, 49).

Ideologically the CU was not an extreme leftist party. According to Papandreou, the primary goal of the party was to decrease the votes of the communist United Democratic Left (UDL) and participate in democracy with the other “nationally-minded” party, the NRU (Clogg 1987:39). However, the CU did not refrain from fiercely attacking the right-wing state establishment after the 1961 elections which some claimed were manipulated by the military. The CU started another “unyielding
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struggle” after the King forced Prime Minister Papandreou to resign in 1965 (Danopoulos 1984:52–53). The existence of left-wing factions within the CU also increased suspicions. For instance, among the parties that formed the CU, the Democratic Union of Ilias Tsirimokos had its roots in the UDL (Clogg 1987:39). There were also claims that 30 deputies were elected to the parliament with communist support (Doumas 1968:262, ff7). Some of the parties that made up the CU (including the Liberal Party) had previously cooperated with the UDL in an electoral coalition and won close to 49% of the votes in 1956 (Kousoulas 1969:336–337).

Leftist factions within the CU gained strength, especially after George Papandreou’s son, Andreas, joined the party in the 1964 government as a minister. Andreas Papandreou’s policies resembled the political objectives of the UDL which advocated the return of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) from exile, separation of Greece from the American sphere of influence, abandonment of NATO membership, removal of foreign military bases in Greece, and the abolition of certificates of anti-communism for employment in the public sector (Kousoulas 1969:336; Legg 1969:201–205). Andreas Papandreou agreed with most of these demands of the UDL. He was especially vocal in criticizing Greece’s alliance with the U.S. and its membership in NATO (Kousoulas 1969:339–344; Woodhouse 1985:5–7). The right-wing military officers interpreted this rhetoric as communistic and fatal for Greek partnership in the Western coalition. Additionally, Andreas Papandreou’s anti-NATO and anti-American policies jeopardized foreign budgetary support for the military by threatening to end the Greek-American alliance that had benefited the armed forces in terms of aid, training, and equipment. On several occasions the CU also explicitly suggested cutting down the military budget (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1987:59).

Since the military in Greece was seen as the bastion of the right wing against an internal communist threat, direct attacks against the military were also interpreted as leftist challenges. Andreas Papandreou was accused of being involved in a leftist organization called Aspida despite his repeated denial of the allegations (Papandreou 1970:145–152, 187–194). The CU called for the democratization of the armed forces, which meant the curtailment of the military’s autonomy from civilian rule. Andreas Papandreou asserted that the military “will not be permitted to point its sword at the throat of Greek democracy” and declared that:

the armed forces are made to serve the national interests. . . . When, as it will, the Center Union returns to power with wide popular support, it will limit the political role of the army. . . . Military officers who dare to question the national character and purposes of the popularly elected government will have no future and no place in the Greek army. Officers of the Greek
army will not be allowed to engage in politics. They will be required to serve the public interests in a professional way under civilian control with overall policy. (quoted in Danopoulos 1984:53–54)

Similarly, the CU demanded an end to the right of the military to vote in the national elections and threatened to abstain if its demand was not met (Genevoix 1973:171). This was due to the fact that the military officers favored the right wing and had enough votes to determine the outcomes of most elections. Thus, it was an important military privilege and safeguard against the left which the CU was insistent on eliminating. Such policies also posed threats to the military’s corporate interests.

Interviews conducted by George Kourvetaris (1999:137–143) with 100 military officers from various ranks in the army during the winter of 1968 and 1969 suggest that they supported the intervention mainly because they perceived a communist threat. Respondents argued that the politicians were unable to suppress the communists and safeguard the country against the leftist danger because of their personal quarrels and their inability to comprehend the social situation. Several factors were cited as evidence of a communist threat, the most important ones being the policies of the CU and Andreas Papandreou. The officers referred to the increasing number of demonstrations in support of the CU as a repetition of the events leading to the Civil War of the 1940s. As one officer explained:

We fought the communists in Korea; we defeated them . . . in Greece. Yet I was stunned to see them again on the sidewalks of Athens. The national danger from communist subversion was seen when Athens was transformed into an arena of mobocracy . . . violent demonstrations which had as their objective chaos and the destruction of Greece rather than the economic improvement of the working classes. The same events repeated as they had in the period of 1944 to 1949. We had no choice but to intervene. (quoted in Kourvetaris 1999:141)

In a recent interview, one of the principals of the coup, Stylianos Pattakos, reiterated that the communist threat and the dangers emanating from the CU were the main reasons for the Colonels’ intervention (2004). The question of whether there was a real communist threat or not prior to the 1967 coup is still one of the most debated aspects of that coup. Given that the CU leadership was not communist, it does not seem that there was a real leftist threat. However, it must be acknowledged that the legacy of the Civil War and the external environment brought about exaggerated claims by the Colonels and the right wing that the CU was dangerous. George Zaharopoulos argues that:
Such fears and beliefs were being daily reinforced by the right-wing press, sections of which kept insisting virtually up until the outbreak of the April coup that Greece was on the threshold of another December (1944) uprising. Many officers—because of the civil war experience and their own deep anti-communist convictions—uncritically accepted these irresponsible press warnings. In other words, the threat of communism was perceived as salient. As is well known, perception of a threat is as potent a factor contributing to behavior as the actual existence of such a threat. (1972:29)

Neovi Karakatsanis further maintains that, “the perception of a threat was real for many people” (2001:33). Such beliefs, then, increased the benefits of an intervention for the Colonels. In other words, the Cold War international context and military indoctrination against the left since World War II led indirectly to the belief that there was a domestic communist challenge that must be repressed. Since the costs of repression were low due to disproportional international aid, the end result was a military intervention that lasted seven years.

Similar cost-benefit calculations led to a democratic regime in Turkey. The Second World War broke up the RPP-economic elite alliance, created cliques within the military, and increased the costs of repression for the authoritarian regime. At the same time, the benefits of keeping the regime intact were on the decline. There were several domestic reasons for this change. First, the newly established DP was not perceived as revolutionary. The Republicans had established an authoritarian regime in the 1930s partially because their secularist reforms were not welcomed by the majority of the electorate. Experiments with democracy in the 1920s resulted in the resurgence of religious activities and threats against the reforms of the Republicans. In the 1940s, however, these reasons for sustaining an authoritarian regime were perceived to be declining (Yılmaz 2002:80–81). President İnönü received personal assurances from the leader of the DP, Celal Bayar, that the new party would safeguard the secular reforms of the Republican era and would not introduce major changes in foreign policy. Except for emphasis on liberal economic principles, the party program did not diverge from the policies of the RPP too much (VanderLippe 2005:138–140). Since the leaders of the DP were well-known politicians during the authoritarian regime, their allegiance to the reforms was perceived as genuine (Albayrak 2004:178–179).

The second domestic factor that decreased the benefits of sustaining an authoritarian regime was the conviction of the Republicans that they could win the elections under a democratic system. The RPP leadership thought that secular reforms were now accepted by the majority of the electorate (Heper 1998:144–145), and they believed that their chances
to come to power again were good. In short, the DP was not seen as a threat to the regime.

In addition to such domestic dynamics which decreased the benefits of sustaining the authoritarian regime, several international factors increased the advantages associated with democracy. Turkey did not enter the Second World War and tried to maintain its neutrality. Fearful of Germany’s presence in Greece and neighboring Balkan states, however, Turkey also tried to appease the Axis powers. Turkey continued to sell chromite, an important raw material in the war industry, to Germany, and it also allowed German military ships, camouflaged as commercial carriers, to use the straits. These policies created discontent in the U.S. and Great Britain (Karaosmanoğlu 1991:161). Both Roosevelt and Churchill demanded that Turkey sever its relations with Germany and declare war against the Axis powers. Under pressure, Turkey first ceased its chromite sales in April 1944, and then cut off diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944. This was followed by Turkey’s decision to sever its connections with Japan in January 1945. Finally, toward the end of the Second World War, Turkey declared war against Germany, with the hope of getting invited to the conference that would mark the beginning of the United Nations. This minor goal was achieved when Turkey joined the Allied powers in San Francisco in 1945. Yet, Turkish gestures came too late and the country’s neutral policy toward Germany isolated the country from the U.S. and Great Britain at the end of the war (Albayrak 2004:35–37).

This isolation became a problem, particularly because the Soviet Union started to threaten Turkey. Already at the beginning of the Second World War, Moscow had demanded that Turkey allow the USSR to build bases in the straits that connected the Black Sea to the Aegean. This request was rejected by the Turkish government since it contradicted the Montreux Convention which recognized Turkish sovereignty over the straits. However, the same issue was raised again at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences. In March 1945, Moscow added another request and made territorial claims on three cities in eastern Turkey—Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin. Even though the U.S. and Great Britain started to oppose Soviet demands after the end of the war, the Turkish government still felt an immediate external threat from Moscow and believed that, unless Turkey received more concrete assurances from the West, it would not be secure against the Soviets (Albayrak 2004:37–42; Eroğul 2003:19–20).

For the leadership of the RPP, it seemed that sustaining the single-party regime in this international context was costly. Making a transition to democracy, on the other hand, was seen as beneficial since it would
help Turkey become part of the Western alliance, although this factor alone cannot explain the Turkish transition to democracy. 9 Sustaining the authoritarian regime had become too costly after the economic and military alliance that supported the RPP disintegrated. At the same time, the benefits of authoritarianism had also declined because the RPP did not perceive a major threat from the DP. Yet, in addition to these factors, the role of the international context in the cost-benefit analysis of the RPP leadership must still be acknowledged. International influences after the Second World War played at least a legitimizing role. The collapse of the fascist regimes after the war and the Turkish foreign policy of allying with the West legitimized the demands and strengthened the hands of the Turkish elite who favored democracy.

President İnönü, who is usually seen as the architect of Turkish democracy, justified the first direct elections of the republic and the participation of the DP in these elections by reference to the Soviet threat to Turkey (Heper 1998:128–163; Loğoğlu 1997). In numerous speeches before the 1946 elections, İnönü argued that the Soviet threat could be thwarted and allies made only if, with direct elections, the nation proved itself unified. İnönü explained his decision to allow multi-party politics by the necessity to demonstrate to foes and allies that the Turkish government’s foreign policy was supported by the entire nation. According to İnönü, only free elections could show that the government genuinely had the support of the Turkish people. President İnönü implied that even if the Democrats won the elections, they would seek Western alliance against the communist bloc, and therefore, prove that the nation was unified around this core foreign policy. In one typical speech in Akşehir, İnönü defended the decision to hold competitive elections as follows:

We decided on the new national elections in order to determine the domestic and foreign . . . policies of the country. It seems that the world has entered into a long period of uncertainty and darkness. In this epoch, the direction of Turkish politics must become internally and externally perceptible . . . Under some circumstances, the official declarations of statesmen are not enough to reveal the policies of the nation. In these situations, the nation must firmly ensure its stand by openly demonstrating its own will. The national elections will give us this result. . . . Only the opinion that is revealed by [the national elections] will demonstrate to the world that our country is on the right path and in a strong condition. (2003:81)

In May 1946, İnönü called the general assembly of his party to a meeting to explain the decision to hold multi-party elections. In his opening speech, İnönü argued that the internal and external circumstances necessitated dispelling doubts about the powers of the parliament. He
implied that domestic support for foreign policy could be demonstrated only with democratic elections (Turan 2003:84–89). Indeed, in this speech and many others in 1946, İnönü clearly tied Turkish democratization to international influences after the Second World War. There were hard-liners in the RPP who were against a competitive regime and favored repressive measures against the DP (Koçak 2003:563; VanderLippe 2005:165–167). It is possible that İnönü and approximately 35 other pro-democracy RPP leaders used foreign threats as justification, especially for the benefit of these skeptics. The Cold War international context entered into the cost-benefit analysis of pro-democratization members of the RPP and became a legitimizing factor for the transition of the regime.

Similarly, the opposition used the international context to strengthen its hand and facilitate a transition to democracy. As early as 1944, the opposition press wrote about German defeat in the war as the defeat of totalitarianism against democracy, implying that Turkey should change its political regime (VanderLippe 2005:103, 105, 110). Criticism intensified after Turkey signed the United Nations Declaration on 24 February 1945. The UN Charter included liberal and democratic principles. During its ratification in the Turkish Parliament, one of the future leaders of the DP, Adnan Menderes, argued that the democratic principles of the UN were not yet fulfilled in Turkey. The newspapers picked up on this issue and “the demand to conform to the United Nations Charter soon became the main theme of the press” (Karpat 1959:142). Even though the UN Charter was not the primary cause of democratization, as Kemal Karpat argues, its approval by the government “provided the dissidents with legal and moral arguments against the one-party system and encouraged them to bring their opposition into the open and to seek popular support” (1959:143).

The first declaration of the RPP dissidents came in June 1945. In this statement, the future leaders of the opposition party demanded liberalization and argued that the policies of the single-party government must be “in line with the victory of the democracies in the war and the emergence of a new global accord” (VanderLippe 2005:120). The declaration stressed that the world was moving toward democracy and Turkey should not be left behind in this process (Koçak 2003:558). After this first move, the opposition continued to use the international context to criticize the RPP. When Turkey could not secure as much economic aid as it wished under the Marshall Plan, the Democrats blamed the authoritarian policies of the RPP. According to the opposition, the single-party regime was creating unfavorable perceptions of Turkey in the West and leading to a reluctance on the part of the West to provide additional aid.
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(VanderLippe 2005:177). Democrats believed that a Turkish alliance with the U.S. would bring democratic and liberal influences to Turkish political and economic systems. Therefore, pressing for democracy at home would go hand-in-hand with a pro-Western and pro-American foreign policy abroad. Thus, in discourse and policy, the opposition frequently used the international context as a justification for its demands. For the RPP leadership, the costs of repressing the DP were high, and besides, the new party did not seem too threatening. Given the additional possibility of international benefits of regime change, the logical choice was to open up the political system.

Conclusion

I have tried to revise conventional views on the impact of foreign factors in both Greece and Turkey after the Second World War. The current empirical evidence raises doubts about the validity of arguments that claim direct American involvement in the Colonels’ junta and maintain that Turkish democratization was only a move to please the U.S. administration. In fact, these arguments contradict each other, thus raising further questions about the true impact of the U.S. in the Aegean.

These reservations, however, do not mean that the international context did not play an important role in Greece and Turkey at this critical time in their histories. I have argued that the main reasons for Turkish democratization and military rule in Greece must be sought in the dynamics of domestic politics. In Greece, the rise of the CU party was one such domestic factor. The political crises preceding the coup, the undemocratic powers of the monarchy, and the experience of the Civil War were other internal determinants. In Turkey, the gradual rise of new economic groups, the unpopular policies of the RPP in the 1940s, and the belief among the power-holders that the RPP could still win in free multi-party elections were among the domestic causes of democratization in that country.

Despite the primary roles these internal factors played, international influences, indirectly, and, in interaction with the developments at home, also contributed to regime change in Greece and Turkey. Robert Dahl’s ideas about the costs of toleration and suppression have provided an important framework for shedding light on these international influences. According to Dahl, the likelihood of authoritarianism increases when the costs of toleration exceed the costs of suppression. When some military officers perceive national and corporate interests under threat, they would be inclined to intervene and the costs of toleration would rise. The Colonels’ dispositions to intervene in Greek politics and
suspend democracy were actions influenced by the Cold War context. The exaggerated fears of communism augmented the already existing benefits associated with authoritarianism and provided legitimization for the Colonels. While the costs of toleration increased due to the perception of communism, American military aid decreased the costs of suppression by altering the balance of power among domestic groups. Years of foreign aid to the Greek military increased the ability of the Colonels to intervene in April 1967 and sustain their regime thereafter. The capacity for repression was, for the most part, a consequence of unbalanced American aid. Without this, it might have been impossible, or at least very difficult, for this small group of junior officers to overthrow the Greek democratic government and remain in power for seven years. Even though this assertion seems to support the argument that the American government was involved in the 1967 junta, there is an important nuance. I argue that the influence was more indirect (and perhaps even unforeseen) than what conventional views hold; American military aid helped create an autonomous and dominant military that could repress weaker societal forces.

Turkish regime change was not influenced by the international context as much as in the Greek case. According to Dahl’s framework, the likelihood of democracy increases when the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration. In Turkey, the rise of the DP was not perceived as threatening by the top leadership of the ruling RPP, at least when compared with the threats posed by previous opposition parties. The costs of toleration were not high due to this domestic reason. The creation of the DP and requests for liberalization, however, were an indirect outcome of the Second World War. The RPP’s response to the war spurred dissident economic elites to demand liberalization. The single-party government could have avoided such detested strategies and implemented its decisions better to cope with shortages and military mobilization. But the policies pursued during the war still led to splits among the elites and among some officers. As a result, the costs of repressing the opposition rose. In addition, given that shortly after the war Turkey wanted to ally with the West, suppressing the DP was seen as more costly. The greatest contribution of the international environment to democratization was certainly this impact on the benefits of regime change. The beginning of the Cold War and Turkish strategic interest in forming an alliance with the U.S. made it more costly to sustain the regime, increased the benefits associated with democracy, and legitimized the process for the opposition and pro-democratic leadership of the RPP. Turkish regime change would have taken place without this international input, but most likely would have taken more time and required a far fiercer battle
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against the skeptics of democratization. Ultimately, American influence in the Aegean in both Greece and Turkey entered into the calculations of the domestic actors in more indirect ways than has previously been assumed or maintained.

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NOTES

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1 For examples of works that emphasize the role of the U.S. in the 1967–1974 Greek junta, see Katris (1971), Papahelas (1997), Papandreou (1970), Rousseas (1967), and Stern (1977). Coulombis, Petropulos, and Psomiades explain most of the major events in modern Greek political history with foreign interference (1976). Several interviews conducted by Nevi Karakatsanis reveal that the Greek elites still have prevalent perceptions on the role of the U.S. in the junta (Karakatsanis and Swarts 2007). Similarly, George Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz argue that “many Greeks believe that the US, particularly through the CIA and NATO, had something to do with the 1967 military coup and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus...” (1987:99). Consequently, polls conducted in the 1980s show that the majority of Greeks regarded the U.S. unfavorably and even as a threat—a trend that seemed to have been at work since the 1950s, especially among the center- and leftist-leaning politicians (Couloumbis 1966).

2 Almost all of the scholarly studies on the transition to democracy in Turkey put equal emphasis on international and domestic factors. See, for examples, Akandere (1998), Albayrak (2004), Eroğul (2003), and Timur (2003). For works that put more stress on international variables, see Karaosmanoğlu (1991), Tamoçoş (1976:292–227), Tachau (1984:174–175), VanderLippe (2005), Yetkin (2003), and Yılmaz (2002). For critiques of this approach, see Ahmad (1977:389–390) and Koçak (2003:560–562). The rise of the Democratic Party and transition to multi-party politics in 1946, of course, did not mean the establishment of a stable and consolidated democracy in Turkey. Indeed, we can consider 1950 a transition to minimal electoral democracy where competitive elections were held, but other democratic institutions, such as human rights and individual liberties, did not necessarily exist. After this date, Turkish democracy experienced several military interventions, but these coups were relatively short-lived and a true authoritarian regime was never established. International influences on the military coups and domestic developments after democracy was established in 1950 are beyond the scope of this article.
For an application of Dahl’s framework in Southern Europe, see Yılmaz (2002).

Greece was forced to leave the Council of Europe in 1969 and relations with the European Economic Community were frozen (Treholt 1972:210–227). The attitude of the Europeans toward the Greek regime caused the Colonels to rely even more heavily on American military aid, diplomatic support, and economic investment.

For an overview of the Greek Civil War, see Woodhouse (2003). For more detailed analyses of international influences during the Civil War, see Baerentzen, Iatrides, and Smith (1987), Iatrides (1981), Wittner (1982), and Xydis (1963).

Note that these numbers are in constant U.S. dollars. For contemporary U.S. dollar figures, see Couloumbis (1983:178). Economic assistance includes an economic support fund and military assistance includes military education, training, and transfers of matériel from excess stocks.

Other factors were the split in the military between higher and lower ranking officers, the involvement of the monarchy in politics, the political crises of the 1960s, and the professional grievances of the Colonels (Veremis 1997:153–154). If the threat of the left were the only reason, then a military intervention would have occurred earlier, when, for instance, the communist United Democratic Left got almost 25% of the votes in 1958. Even though the rise of the Center Union was not the only reason for the 1967 intervention, its importance must still be acknowledged. Because I focus on external influences and perceptions of a leftist threat due to the international context here, more attention is given to this factor.

In the elections of November 1963, the armed forces vote produced a 2.7% nationwide difference between the results of the NRU and the CU. 60.5% of the officers voted for the NRU as opposed to 39.4% of the electorate. Without the military vote, the CU would have gained more seats in the parliament (Clogg 1987:45–46).

Note that, in Robert Dahl’s terminology, this is an increase in the costs of suppression and it does not affect the costs of toleration.

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